

RESPONSE TO DAVID BORGIO

(A Materialist and an Integralist Walk into a Bar . . .)

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I have long regarded David Borgo as one of the bright lights in jazz research and emblematic of the artist-scholar identity that I hold to be increasingly important for the future of musicology. I thank him for the time and attention he has put into his review of my book, *Improvisation, Creativity and Consciousness: Jazz as Integral Template for Music, Education and Society* (SUNY 2012).¹ I respond with the following thoughts in hopes of furthering conversation on what I believe are potentially fruitful, if challenging lines of inquiry.

My response is driven by three primary motivations. First involves efforts to address blatant misconceptions and misrepresentations of the book, which I believe are considerable. I nonetheless do my best to avoid the “disgruntled author syndrome” that one often sees in the face of unfavorable reviews and make all attempts to, as a second motivation, render points of contention openings for new kinds of thinking and conversation about jazz, music/music studies, spirituality and the role of the arts in education and society at large.

Borgio’s review, in my estimation, undermines the prospects for any such discourse through an array of lapses. These include distortion of the very words I have written, evasion of key principles that might significantly alter his conclusions, and superficial engagement with challenging ideas that penetrate to the heart of prevailing music studies and the overall educational paradigm. His occasional moments of derision, particularly when it comes to spiritual/mystical considerations—what might be called academic “easy targets”—further preempt productive inquiry and exchange. Particularly disappointing are his tendencies to infer polarization in my arguments for co-evolutionary relationships in key areas of musical artistry, including the interplay between traditional grounding and robust creative excursion, improvising and composing, and interpretive (classical) and creative musicianship. Whereas I celebrate the symbiotic interaction between the modalities, Borgo somehow manages to portray my account of the various forms of engagement as competing.

A third motivation behind my response extends directly from the first two, where I situate contrasting perspectives on musical creativity and its development within the context of contrasting views on consciousness and their ramifications for the future of music studies, education and humanity at large. Our deepest convictions about the nature of the human being and our place in the cosmic wholeness directly shapes our capacities for future imagining, both within specific disciplines and across the broader spectrum of life. I elaborate on these points in the final three chapters of ICC: Music School of the Future, Paradigmatic Change and the 21st Century Academy, and Planet Earth Takes a Solo. Unfortunately, Borgo completely sidesteps this terrain and circumvents potentially interesting conversation about arts-driven change in general, and jazz-driven transformation in particular.

To be fair, ICC is long and far-reaching; it would be unrealistic to expect a single review/er to address its full scope. Nonetheless, I believe the ontological significance of future visioning in nature-of-consciousness debates, where discourse moves from the disconnected pockets of the

academy to realm of real-world problem solving, tends to be overlooked. Consideration, in other words, of what consciousness *does* may significantly shape how we understand what consciousness *is*, let alone yield far-reaching interventions that might not otherwise come into view. I do not mince words in my assessment that materialism, falling dramatically short in terms of its future visioning potential, is an unsustainable blueprint for the survival of civilization as we know it.²

A brief overview of materialist and integral perspectives lay groundwork for further discussion.

From a materialist vantage point, consciousness is considered either reducible to, or—at the opposite end of the materialist continuum, where Borgo appears to position himself—an emergent property of a physical (neurobiological) substrate. This runs in stark contrast to the integral, post-materialist orientation to which I subscribe, which views consciousness as neither reducible nor epiphenomenal to matter, but as primary in the broader scheme of creation.³

Whereas materialism, rooted in a science/spirituality divide, leaves little room for notions such as soul, transcendent dimensions of consciousness, mystical experience/development and other facets that have long been central to wisdom traditions across the globe, an integral understanding is predicated on robust spirituality/science synthesis,⁴ embrace of age-old wisdom, and a range of transformative capacities that, as I argue, are key to humanity navigating the complexities of the present juncture in history.⁵

Materialism is thus epistemologically narrow, fragmented and flat (devoid of both interior and exterior topography) and critically/self-critically impaired.⁶ Integralism is epistemically broad, integrative, rich in interior and exterior landmarks that are central to creativity/consciousness-driven paradigmatic change, and—pending vigilance among its practitioners—equipped with strong capacities to critically interrogate itself and other models.

When, therefore, Borgo intimates that he and the (materialist) academy occupy a kind of critical integrity high ground against which advocacy of alternative principles and worldviews must, to be taken seriously, withstand one-way critical scrutiny, I believe he opens up a kind of Pandora's Box that unleashes significant challenges to the very platform on which much of his review rests. Later I elaborate on my assessment that Borgo takes a further step beyond critical hubris in failing to engage ICC's forays into the nature of critical inquiry itself.

ICC sheds important light on these shortcomings through its identification of two epistemic crises that take us to the heart of materialist/integral distinctions. First involves the disappearance of meditation in Western intellectual life; as Pierre Hadot reminds us, the ancient Greco-Roman philosophical schools that have yielded the systems of logic and critical analysis to which the academy pays homage were predicated on contemplative engagement that led awareness to strata of experience transcendent of ordinary mental functioning (349). From an integral standpoint, the academy has skimmed the 3rd-person epistemic surface and discarded its 1st-person foundations—consciousness-based, transpersonal methodologies—from which surface structures would arise.

The same thing happened when improvisation began to fade from common practice in the European tradition. As a subset of the overarching educational crisis, 3rd-person surface musical features—in the form of Eurocanonic repertory—would be favored at the expense of the vital 2nd-person creative foundations of musical artistry without which, needless to say, surface structures would not exist.

The two epistemic crises are manifestations of what I call a Matrix of Materialism (124) that engulfs much academic practice (including its notably limited, if not distorted notions of critical integrity).

When, therefore, Borgo not only evades this analysis, and thus ICC's delineation of an integral model of critical inquiry, and presumes critical privilege, he—albeit unwittingly—raises questions about the very bedrock upon which the conventional academy is built.

The point is not that integral perspectives are inherently immune to bias and thus beyond critical reproach. Rather, that epistemically expansive frameworks, particularly when grounded in consciousness-based interiors, are, by nature, more conducive to distanced interrogation of the assumptions and practices that define both preferred and contrasting paradigms. Practitioners who make use of these tools are thus capable of both heightened diagnostic penetration and expanded contemplation of new horizons.

Perhaps one further motivation might be inferred in my essay, which may help justify its length: This is to provide an overview of Integral Theory for readers who have yet to encounter the framework and, for those who resonate with its core premises, alert them to the kinds of reactions (and over-reactions) that they will likely encounter in the nonintegral academy. For those who identify as change agents, I believe this might be a useful lens through which to engage my thoughts.

Section 1 provides detailed engagement with the musical dimensions of Borgo's commentary. The primary focus of section 2 is consciousness, which sets the stage for what I propose as an improvisation-based ontology of consciousness. Sections 3 and 4 take up a further range of issues that underscore my concerns about compromised critical integrity.

Readers are strongly encouraged to consult the footnotes, either during or following the main text, for important additional commentary as well as a series of questions that I pose to Borgo were he and I to engage in subsequent exchange.

1.

A single passage from Borgo's review encapsulates much of my concerns.

Sarath champions . . . attractive albeit vaguely defined notions throughout the text, such as inclusion and diversity, but when he actually provides musical examples, they betray, more often than not, ideologically motivated hierarchies and binaries. Improvisation and composition are positioned as different not only in degree of creativity, but also in kind, but it is musical interpretation that seems to be Sarath's primary target of criticism. In musical interpretation, as described by Sarath, the performer is beholden to choices already made by a composer and can only manipulate a few 'nonsyntactic' elements as a kind of 'secondary creativity' (Sarath is here employing rather outdated notions of

musical syntax put forward by Leonard Meyer.) In doing so, Sarath essentially dismisses a huge swathe of the world's music, for which notions of improvisation that are dear to Sarath may not apply at all. Perhaps we should be telling traditional shakuhachi players that they have no hope of enlightenment since they are merely interpreting a musical tradition?⁷

For starters, Borgo misquotes me when it comes to my account of the improvisation-composition relationship, in so doing sidestepping my extensive analysis of the co-evolutionary nature of the respective processes. I *do not* state that improvisation and composition differ in degree of creativity, rather that they differ not in degree but “in kind (of creativity)” (170). I believe it is imperative to respond to the common view of improvisation as a subspecies of composition, which in my estimation could not be more misguided. The two processes need to be understood on their own terms, at which point their synergistic interactive potential can be harnessed. I elaborate on Steve Lacy's wisdom: “There is a music that must be composed, there is another that can only be improvised (195).”⁸ This neither overlooks ways in which the processes intersect, nor—more significantly to the discussion at hand—suggests that one is more creative than the other. Borgo completely misses these points, and from his seminal twisting of words stem a stream of further distortions. The fact that this culminates in blatant misportrayal of my views on tradition, to be taken up shortly, is particularly disappointing given the attention I devote to its importance in musical (and later in spiritual) development.

But let me first go further into the improvisation-composition relationship as well as creative musicianship-interpretive musicianship relationship, which he also misconstrues. I frame both relationships within the Contemporary Improviser Composer Performer identity that prevailed in earlier times in European classical music and would make its 20th century return in jazz (236-40).⁹ The expressive and transformative power of the CICP lies in the co-evolutionary, synergistic relationship between its constituent processes, which exemplify not only epistemological diversity but further principles that distinguish integral from materialist conceptual frameworks.

Central is that knowledge systems evolve in the direction of differentiated wholeness, with differentiation punctuated at times by instances of dissociation, where one or more parts become disconnected from, and stand in opposition to other parts and the whole (28, 66, 104). The science/spirituality divide at the heart of academic materialist ideology, a relatively recent development in Western thought (at least to the extent it has taken hold), is a primary example. As the philosopher Pierre Hadot reminds us (to cite a particularly important ICC point Borgo fails to engage), the ancient Greco-Roman philosophical schools from which the intellectual/scientific stream has evolved were also contemplative/spiritual communities within which not only interior practices but pre-materialist worldview assumptions were central (349).¹⁰ In lopping off received systems of logic, rational thought and notions of critical inquiry and discarding the transpersonal epistemologies that gave rise to them, what is uncritically embraced as the intellectual bedrock of the academy is, in fact, a dissociated part from a broader epistemic whole. I elaborate further on the ramifications of this dissociation for critical integrity below.

Direct parallels may be noted in music which highlight the importance of the CICP framework. From an earlier, epistemically diverse/differentiated model (CICP), the subsequent creation/performance split (dissociation) that dominates academic music studies—whereby improvisation became virtually extinct, composition relegated to a minority, and interpretive

musicianship became the task of the musical majority—would significantly limit the preparation of generations of musicians. The advent of the Interpretive Performance Specialist (IPS) (344) is the musical manifestation of science/spirituality dissociation in education at large, which is the source of a Matrix of Materialism (124) that engulfs learning and research models across the arts, humanities and sciences.¹¹

Here Borgo overlooks an important distinction in my analysis and thus further distorts ICC's co-evolutionary narrative. My critique is, contrary to what he infers above, not directed at interpretive musicianship *pe se*, but the *specialized* interpretive musicianship (IPS) paradigm that has been severed from the broader (CICP) framework and imposed upon the majority of students. Omitted in his review is my case for interpretive musicianship, and thus engagement with the European canon, to take its next evolutionary strides (56) when the dissociated part is restored to its more healthy differentiated status within the CICP context. I thus cannot help but wonder if Borgo projects his inherited dissociative lens onto my efforts to both diagnose and heal the problem. Epistemologically narrow and fragmented models beget, and are programmed to see only more epistemic dearth and splintering, what Borgo calls 'hierarchies and binaries.' But, upon closer inspection, Borgo manages to find hierarchies and binaries where none exist (CICP and constituent processes), and appears oblivious to them where they do exist (the IPS music studies framework as a historical mutation).

Turning now to the topic of tradition, I emphasize throughout the book the importance of "emulative/exploratory" interplay, (185) defined by strong grounding in traditional practice/s along with robust creative excursions, to optimal musical development and understanding. Balanced emulative/exploratory experience, which will differ from one musician and musical culture to the next, is central to individuation (224-250). Here I apply C.G. Jung's term for the emergence of a rich personalized identity, informed by interior and exterior criteria, to the evolution of the richly personalized musical voice—a central aspect of the jazz tradition. I also emphasize early on my "Western syncretic aesthetic" (3) orientation, which—as explicit in the title of the book—seeks to illuminate how musicians in the West embark on musical and broader developmental pathways, in so doing encountering wide ethno-epistemological terrain in their individuating quests. However, important principles in my model apply across cultures, for which I also offer commentary.

When Borgo nonetheless ascribes to my vision an anti-traditional bias that excludes 'a huge swath of the world's music,' he further misrepresents essential aspects of ICC.

Let me elaborate through an educational lens, given its prominence in the book (including its subtitle), as yet another key area Borgo sidesteps.

My primary aim is to lay groundwork for a music studies model that accommodates as wide a range of individuation pathways as possible.¹² Some CICPs will gravitate toward normative terrain, others toward music that extends genre boundaries beyond the point of recognition. However, most musicians will—reflecting the syncretic thrust of the overarching culture—evolve a personal voice that reflects some sort of normative and boundary-crossing, or emulative/exploratory balance (185). Most essential is that individuation blossoms from within, for which epistemologically diverse educational environments are conducive, as opposed to

being institutionally imposed (more the norm than exception). There is a radical difference, moreover, between arriving at one's musical destination from a wide slate of options as opposed to the typical narrow slate in most music programs. It is also important to emphasize that individuation is ultimately an internal affair, contrary to appearances and misconceptions: Musicians that play "out," perhaps due to political-correctness or fashion, may be as bereft of interior grounding, and thus prone to superficial expression, as those who play "in" for the same reasons. By the same token, musicians who individuate in highly conservative/normative directions yet are driven by a deep soul connection may transmit as magical and transcendent an expressive impact as the most experimental music that also stems from the innermost realms of consciousness (231). I quote Jung himself, when he distinguishes individuation from "rugged individualism," to underscore this point.

The interplay between tradition-specific, emulative grounding and trans-tradition exploratory experience (even for musicians who subsequently lean more conservatively) is key to the individuation imperative.

Here I might respond briefly to Borgo's characterization of Meyer's notion of musical syntax as 'outmoded' (for which he provides no elaboration) and its relevance to the present discussion. In fact, I have made excellent use of syntactic/nonsyntactic distinctions in several ways. From a pedagogical standpoint, I begin my improvisation teaching with nonsyntactic parameters and then, depending on the type of improvisation class, proceed to style-based, syntactic approaches. More pertinent here is that I use the parameters to delineate a kind of inner mechanics for individuation, including how not only musical but extramusical influences (life experience) are, as it were, metabolized into sound (62). I also find syntactic/nonsyntactic distinctions important to distinguishing between creativity in and beyond the arts (72). When it comes to engagement with modal traditions in and beyond the West, I modify Meyer's harmonic/melodic/rhythmic syntactic framework to "pitch-rhythmic languages," (30, 49) which, while not applicable to all of the world's music, applies to a significant global expanse.¹³

But the centrality of grounding in a musical mother tongue, regardless of range of broader excursions therefrom, is a key aspect of ICC and its dynamic approach to tradition.

I give further shape to this premise by identifying key landmarks on the syncretic journey, for which George Lewis' notions of Afrological and Eurological streams (286) are particularly useful to musicians in the West. "Anything but flat," I state, "the musical world requires identification of its important contours if it is to be successfully navigated. Afrological and Eurological streams, while certainly *not the only ones*, are essential for Western musicians to access the central syncretic current, and an important reason for this is their respective improvisatory and composition processes." (63) Nonetheless, yet again in direct conflict with what I actually write (sorry to keep doing this), Borgo states that "it escapes Sarath completely that there might be other logics than Afro and Euro,"¹⁴ His weak telepathic abilities aside, I believe Borgo may here have fallen prey to what I call a "multicultural smorgasborg syndrome," (325) where the highlighting of key cultural landmarks elicits kneejerk reactions against privileging any given cultural location/s—no matter how salient it/they might be for not only cultural identity but broader exploration and understanding—at the expense of others.¹⁵

When I state, then, that “Afrological grounding provides all-important improvisatory and rhythmic tools for 21st century CICPs; Eurological offers invaluable compositional and related practices” (277), I emphasize that this in turn invites extensive infusion of further global influences. I also emphasize that this need not unfold in a linear manner, where only after some degree of Afro-Euro synthesis is in place (which is inherent in jazz itself), are broader excursions valid or productive (276).

I nonetheless believe these conversations remain in their infancy and note that ICC takes its Afro/Euro/global investigation yet farther in delineating a multi-tiered tradition-specific/trans-traditional framework as a kind of future guide. Here I situate the emulative/exploratory interplay atop not one but two strata of tradition-specific engagement that unite Western and non-Western foundations. Western CICPs will thus combine grounding in jazz (and whatever other Western lineages align with their individuation needs) and a tradition in which some notion of “primordial sound” is key (470). This might include Hindustani raga, Arabic maqam, particularly with a Sufi orientation, or Korean shamanic musical practice, among many other possibilities. Recognizing that more than a few musicians have already begun to move in this direction, I surmise that this multi-traditional grounding will not only promote further creative development, but also may be important to further harnessing the transformative impact of music.

The ICC framework, then, contrary to Borgo’s misrepresentation, is not only predicated on opening up wide-ranging global connections, but is capable of accommodating musicians from all backgrounds and tradition-driven aspirations. It enables musicians in the West seeking to focus on a given lineage to do so, following a period of epistemically diverse CICP studies that would likely give them tools for both affirming, and enhancing, engagement with their chosen destination. The model is also applicable to nonWestern/nonsyncretic contexts, with or without a CICP component, in that the emulative/exploratory interplay and the evolution of a distinctly personal voice is still possible even within what might appear (due to cultural bias) to be the narrow horizons of a given lineage. Emulation (of master practitioners) is a given, with the complementary exploratory thrust entailing not cross-cultural syncretism (and thus horizontal expeditions), but deepened, interior engagement that promotes merging of richly personal influences and transcendent, archetypal content.

Borgo not only sidesteps my pedagogical commentary and its ramifications for tradition in the Music School of the Future chapter but in a subsequent chapter called Paradigmatic Change in the 21st Century Academy. There I draw parallels between the challenges encountered in advancing jazz in music studies and contemplative/consciousness studies in the broader academy (356). I juxtapose my analysis of jazz education from modernist to postmodern to integral stages, all predicated on respective views of the jazz tradition (presented in an earlier chapter called Jazz in the Academy) with similar stages in the late 20th/early 20th century contemplative studies movement. In response to the confusion around the importance of tradition-specific grounding that impedes both educational movements, I illuminate intersections between the place of lineage in contemporary musical navigation and contemporary spiritual navigation to advance discourse and practice in both realms.¹⁶

It might also be noted that Borgo, in both denying my emphasis on tradition and global applicability, may contradict himself in this and further contexts. What are Afrological and

Eurological streams, which he claims dominate my conception at the exclusion of others, but traditions? He also clearly contradicts himself in one of his more confounding statements, where he ascribes to my thinking the “unquestioned superiority of jazz and improvised music,”¹⁷ and thus suddenly shifts from accusations of aversion to tradition to the opposite extreme: Which is it David—my traditional bias or my anti-traditional bias ?

In sum, a litany of distortions—where ICC’s co-evolutionary relationship between improvisation and composition, creative and interpretive musicianship, tradition-specific and trans-traditional engagement are skewed—is exacerbated by an even larger inventory of evasion tactics, including neglect of emulative/exploratory interplay, CICP artistry, individuation, educational application, global connections and more. As I explore in the next section, this problem continues when it comes to Borgo’s engagement with ICC’s commentary on consciousness.

And thus when it comes to ‘telling Shakuhachi players that they cannot gain enlightenment because they are interpreting a tradition,’ I cannot help but wonder: Might the only one who even remotely surmises anything in this direction be David Borgo?¹⁸

2.

Borgo’s use of the term ‘enlightenment’ provides a bridge for examining our contrasting views on consciousness and clarification of ICC’s integral approach to the topic.

First is that materialism appears to have little to say on higher stage consciousness development, whereas Integral Theory offers extensive commentary on the topic that is informed by cross-cultural, transdisciplinary/transpersonal and other kinds of analysis (including neurobiological findings, 98-104). Inasmuch as the notion of enlightenment is prone to exoticization and pop cultural connotations, I thus devote significant attention in ICC to defining what I mean by the term, and periodically invoke the word “realization” as synonymous in hopes of minimizing superficiality and confusion.

Second is that the higher stage realization principle poses important ramifications for nature-of-consciousness debates, and to sidestep the considerable discussion in ICC is another, particularly conspicuous example of Borgo’s evasion tendencies.

Let me briefly summarize two central lines of inquiry from ICC that I believe are important to these debates and, in fact, may issue significant challenges to materialism. The first is phenomenological, where I trace a wide continuum of manifestations of self-awareness—from ordinary experience to higher stage development—to illustrate the alignment between subjective experience and ontological premises. Thinking of phenomenology as straddling the spheres of ontology (what something is) and epistemology (mode of inquiry), progression through the stages increasingly blurs any such distinctions. In the culminating nondual stage, the status of improvisation as both epistemic lens into, and ontologically synonymous with, the fundamental nature of consciousness and cosmic wholeness moves most robustly from theoretical premise to direct noetic experience.

A second, empirical lens offers further support for the account. A growing body of scientific research into extended capacities of consciousness, sometimes called *psi*, while marginalized in

the academy, strongly point toward an integral understanding of mind. While it may be premature to announce the “collapse of materialism,” (132)—to invoke the title of an ICC chapter subhead—based on purely phenomenological reasoning, the fact that materialism exhibits no such theoretical coherence at the very least raises red flags for those inclined to cling to its defense.

2a

At the heart of the phenomenological continuum is what Robert Forman, Charles Alexander and others call “pure consciousness,” as in the deep meditative silence that is, at once, exquisitely wakeful yet completely devoid of content (other than awareness of awareness itself), and which serves as a kind of anchor for all manifestations (109-10).¹⁹ I analyze this in terms of union, again the essence of yoga or religion, between a personal egoic dimension of self and a transcendent, eternal Self (14,74, 82-86). I further suggest—paralleling the importance of research into improvisation being grounded in direct experience of the process—that pure consciousness serve as a kind of anchor in consciousness research. To know consciousness requires direct experience, on the part of the researcher, of consciousness in its most fundamental or purely self-referral state. I would suggest the same practice-based criterion, whereby researchers have strong experiential grounding in that which is researched, holds for improvisation. The fact that self-Self union is not only accessible through the silence of meditation, but can also manifest in the midst of the most intensive mental, physical or sensory engagement—whether Zen shakuhachi or Hindustani raga/tala performance, or NFL place kicking—may likely be the reason why many jazz artists combined both robust improvisatory work with contemplative engagement (84).

Furthermore, and now we proceed from fleeting “states” of transcendence to enduring “stages,” (83-86) self-Self union can permeate the entirety of waking/dreaming/sleeping existence. Hence, the critical threshold by which integralists and many mystical traditions define enlightenment or realization. Among the important integral contributions to understanding this phenomenon is illumination of *both* culture-specific features *and* universal dimensions that transcend cultural boundaries. Hence, the merging of postmodern (perception of reality is culturally mediated) and integral perspectives (transcultural perception of reality).

Integralists often invoke the Vedantic account given its quasi-universal applicability. From this standpoint, *turiyatita cetena*, corresponding to what integralists also call the “subtle” stage, is the first instance of enduring self-Self integration. Here liberation from conditioned attachments coexists with experience of individuality as a facet of universality. The wave realizes itself as both distinct from but also as an inextricable part of the ocean. Features of peak improvisatory creativity—measured in terms of generation of compelling ideas, mind-body integration and thus performative fluidity, and interconnectedness among performers and listeners—all of which are certainly glimpsed prior to enduring self-Self union—deepen and grow in consistency (42).

Bhagavad cetena, “causal” consciousness, sees further growth of the above capacities along with expansion of the heart. Enlivenment of deep feeling capacities opens up perception to primordial, archetypal impulses and structures at transcendent strata of creation, hence expanding the array of influences that may shape creative expression and the resultant individual voice, also imbuing it with heightened transformative impact (104-109). Such phenomena may manifest in a variety

of ways, including awareness of subtle energy forms or other mystical phenomena (witnessing, communion with discarnate intelligences, etc). The more the spectrum of influences expands to encompass these interior dimensions, the richer the infusion of exterior (personal, socio-cultural, somatic and environmental) influences in the individuation process.

As consciousness opens up to the culminating nondual stage, *Brahmi çetena*, the all-important experience of interconnectedness between improvisers, listeners and environment becomes yet more vivid. For now, human intersubjectivity—a manifestation of nonlocal consciousness—may be understood, and is directly experienced as, a facet of cosmic intersubjectivity/nonlocality. The very curving back of the self onto the Self that underlies human improvisatory creativity is indistinguishable from the self-referral curving back of the cosmic subject—Brahma—onto itself at the heart of the eternal improvisatory creativity, *lila*, through which undifferentiated universal wholeness spawns the infinitely differentiated tapestry of manifest reality (105-8).²⁰

Heightened intersubjectivity is central among an array of transformative ramifications that extend from the above analysis and an improvisation-based ontology of consciousness. When the heightened *feeling* of oneness between improvisers is understood as more than poetic musing, or subjective sensory illusion, but contact with an ontologically veridical stratum of reality, it is then possible to explore ways this principle might be harnessed for evolutionary impact. Here improvised musical art helps bring into focus an emergent body of empirical findings that suggest collective meditation practice can generate a transformative impact that results in reduced crime and violence, illness and accidents (70,305). Further exemplifying connections between arts-driven and socio-spiritual interventions, the intersubjective consciousness principle may also extend to areas such as peace building (305) and, even more far-reaching, ecosustainability interventions that are predicated on mind-matter interaction. While the idea, as Radin surmises, that teams of intention experts may be able to impact climate and weather in draught-stricken regions (412) undeniably challenges the academy at its core, such capacities for “anomaly centering” (403) are part and parcel of paradigmatic change. Materialism short circuits the very capacities for even imagining such possibilities.²¹ Improvisation-inspired awareness of intersubjective consciousness helps disrupt unexamined materialist aversion to thinking in this direction.

If these and other ideas and possibilities are to be explored, close examination of worldview assumptions and biases is essential. ICC emphasizes capacities for “anomaly centering” ()—moving phenomena and possibilities at the outer edges of the human imagination to front and center stage, where they can critically engaged and potentially harnessed for collective growth. I describe this in terms of “jazz-inspired swinging” (19, 369) from the most far-reaching questions about ultimate reality and meaning to the most localized details of analysis and craft. Borgo and his materialist academy, incapable of this kind of swinging, thus remain oblivious to both the historical roots of prevailing epistemic crisis and how they decimate capacities for future visioning.

Central to the way forward for humanity is the coexistence of ancient wisdom and cutting-edge contemporary developments; the need is thus urgent to replace the materialist science/spirituality divide with integral spirituality/art/science synthesis.

Correlations between human creative and spiritual evolution and planetary alignments is another area that ICC broaches within this context and which, while academically taboo, has age-old roots in cultures across the globe and may be understood in new light from an improvisation-inspired view of nondual consciousness. Philosopher Richard Tarnas illuminates the link between archetypal impulses deep in the psyche and planetary configurations (404, 67-69), which supports analysis of the individuation process as both human and cosmic in nature. He exposes academically constructed divisions between subjectivity and objectivity, and interior and exterior realities: “What could be more *outer* than cosmos? What could be more *inner* than psyche?” (34), which is coherent with integral phenomenology’s blurring of its constituent epistemic and ontological lines, along with, as noted above, those between individuality and universality.

In short, ICCs’ improvisation-based ontology of consciousness—the idea that *human beings are co-evolutionary participants in the cosmic improvisatory unfolding* (136, 405)—in a single stroke illuminates obstacles in materialist ideology and opens up new arts-driven transformative pathways.

The addition of empirical findings to the mix significantly strengthens the case, presenting what are arguably insurmountable obstacles to materialist ideology. Here I thus turn to a closer look at *psi* phenomena (132-36), or extended capacities of consciousness, which more recently are situated within the context of exo-studies, in order to add an empirical dimension to the phenomenological argument (and challenge to materialism).

3.

In ICC, in a section entitled “The Collapse of Materialism” (132), I give a dozen examples of overarching categories—including physically transcendent, nonlocal, intersubjective dimensions of mind, disembodied (or what psychologist Jenny Wade calls “discarnate”) consciousness (hence correlations with notions of “ancestors” as well as strata of spiritual entities that are central to not only African cultures but traditions across the globe), remote cognition, and mind-matter (psychokinesis)—within which large volumes of studies have been conducted. Ramifications for expanded understanding of improvisation, creativity, interaction (particularly via heightened intersubjective consciousness), individuation (including archetypal dimensions) immediately come into focus. In terms of nature-of-consciousness debates; if even a fraction of the studies—conducted at Institute of Noetic Sciences, Princeton’s former PEAR lab, University of Virginia Division of Perceptual Studies, US Military, Maimonides Hospital—are valid, materialism confronts near-fatal challenges. As William James asserted, in order to show that not all crows are black, one only needs to find one white crow. (135) And while I emphasize that it would be premature to view these findings as absolute verification of the primacy of consciousness, they point vastly more in that direction than any of the materialist models point toward the opposite (consciousness as emergent or epiphenomenal). The fact, moreover, that these capacities are coherent with higher stage development, with Patanjali’s *yoga sutras* commonly cited in this context among the mystical literature, cannot be overstated, for now phenomenological rationale works in tandem with empirical support.

Unfortunately, Borgo—even as he appeals for a more comprehensive critique—deals with none of these challenges to his very materialist platform, and instead continues to allow its narrow horizons to skew his reading of the ideas I put forth.

It is also important to note that while the above phenomenological continuum and empirical considerations pose both 1st-person/3rd-person challenges to materialism, important 2nd-person challenges may also be noted.

The following passage, for example, is fraught with inaccuracies and tinges of derision in response to ICC's 1st-2nd-3rd person scope.

Sarath has little patience for critical social theories or post-modern skepticism, but in their place he forwards a bewildering array of 'integral' theories about music that include an astrologer aligning musical and cultural developments with planetary conjunctions, a nuclear physicist relating electrons in the oxygen atom to notes of the major scale, and a chemist correlating musical intervals with the periodic table of elements.²²

To begin with ICC's actual socio-cultural/postmodern commentary, compare Borgo's assessment with what the book actually explores:

Postmodern perspectives are situated within the Four Quadrant framework (), four models of the jazz tradition (277), the general orientation of jazz research (183), multicultural/transcultural analysis (238,326), commentary on individuation (233-45), the developmental trajectory of the contemplative studies movement (385-90), and overall educational critique (140-145). Moreover, consistent with integral approaches to the topic, ICC celebrates postmodern contributions even if recognizing limitations in the perspective (confined to 2nd-person considerations). As I note, "Wilber has come under attack for his sharp critiques of the limitations of postmodern absolutism, (yet) detractors often overlook his equally strong endorsement of postmodern contributions as an important part, just not the totality, of the larger evolutionary picture" (156). I even argue that the integral viewpoint, due to its wider epistemic lens, actually enables a more informed grasp of postmodern patterns and precepts.²³ Nonetheless, Borgo not only evades this 2nd-person terrain but makes a statement that ascribes evasion tactics to ICC.²⁴

When he then describes as 'bewildering' ICC's exploration of the nexus of primordial sound, consciousness, soul and cosmos that has been part and parcel of cultures across the globe and time immemorial, he betrays his academic, materialist blinders.

Harkening back to above discussion on integral nonduality: Instead of engaging with commentary surrounding Alice Coltrane, the Vedantic conception of *dyotish* (135), correlations between planetary alignments and, as one example, the socio-musical turbulence of the 1960s (349), Borgo—already having sidestepped the commentary setting the stage for informed engagement with this terrain, can only default to academic cynicism (e.g. his reference to Tarnas, a pre-eminent philosopher of mind and cultural historian for whose work cosmic correlations with human behavior are a but a part of his broader vision, as an 'astrologer'). As tempting these academic 'easy targets' may be in a research culture that is remarkably tied to a narrow spectrum of inquiry (even as it may claim fervent commitment to disciplinary and cultural diversity), I suggest that the time has come to redirect the critical gaze back on the sheltered nature of the academy and its legion of normative critic/s.

Parallel lapses are evident in Borgo's critique of my notion of the emergence of the "divine feminine" as part of my archetypal analysis, which is inspired in part by the work of feminist anthropologist Heidi Göttner Abendroth. Just as she surmises that improvisation was far more central in ancient matriarchical civilizations and gave way to patriarchal approaches (201), I correlate jazz and improvised music with a matriarchal aesthetics, as opposed to the patriarchal orientation of the creatively-segmented Eurological paradigm. Unfortunately, instead of engaging this reasoning and its underlying principles, Borgo becomes entangled in the most superficial and obvious considerations—involving jazz's deeply sexist history and "machismo" culture.²⁵

Of course jazz culture has been brutal for women!

But when we step back and view the situation from a broader teleological perspective, might there be underlying forces at play that are inherent in the creative framework itself that have lain relatively dormant heretofore and yet, when enlivened, may give rise to a new era? Might, in fact, we be seeing glimpses of movement in that direction, even since the publication of ICC, if not Borgo's review of the book?

Nor does he engage the broader range of very contrasting ramifications (e.g. educational, environmental) that extend from integral and materialist paradigms.

In this regard, I believe his assessment of ICC as lacking in "supporting and contrasting perspectives . . ." ²⁶ is highly misleading, notwithstanding his not-unreasonable suggestion of a few sources that might be missing from my otherwise fairly extensive reference list. Indeed, I invite Borgo to identify even a few sources—perhaps even just one—that draw from as wide a range of materialist/postmaterialist commentary.²⁷ Materialist sources in ICC include Patricia Churchland, Daniel Dennett, Francis Crick, John Searle, Antonio Damasio; dualist include Steven J Gould, David Chalmers—who later would move on from dualism); panpsychists include Alfred North Whitehead, Henri Bergson, David Skrbina; integralists include Ken Wilber, Jennifer Wade, Leslie Combs, Sean Esbörn-Hargens, Brenda Dunne, Robert Jahn, John Hagelin, Charles Alexander, Fred Travis, David Orme-Johnson and Dean Radin.

Of course, there is always room for greater inclusivity. But here an important point comes into focus: The bulk of materialist literature is notably bereft of anything near this scope, particularly when it comes to serious engagement with nonmaterialist literature. Clearly, the academy is so deeply indoctrinated into materialist ideology that alternative viewpoints do not warrant serious consideration. They are rendered invisible; it is as if the onus is on advocates of alternatives to materialism to make their case, and until this happens materialism—protected by decades of stasis, if not legions of henchmen—will continue to get a free pass.

4.

When all is said and done, each of us has to decide not only what kind of narrative informs our day-to-day work and future horizons, but the critical rationale that underlies any such perspective/s. How, in fact, can we be so sure that our most cherished convictions—

whether in the form of integralism, materialism or any of the possible worldviews available—are the most viable?

The reality is, we can't, and I presume Borgo would agree with me, at least to a reasonable degree, on this account. At which point, I propose several steps that may be helpful to both individual clarification and collective exchange. The first entails stepping back from worldview labels (just as I urge we do when it comes to musical labels) and devoting attention to the process of worldview construction and self-critique. Why do we gravitate toward the ideas and models that attract us? To what extent have we critiqued our biases, and—from an informed perspective—how our ideological destinations contrast and intersect with others? To what extent—and here is where I believe the academy, contrary to its claims, falls dramatically short—have we inquired into the process of critical inquiry itself?

In this context, perhaps the most telling example of Borgo's evasion tendencies involves a section in ICC called "Tales of Two Epistemologies" (349-53). Here I parallel the remarkably similar ordeals involved in advocating improvisation in music studies and advancing contemplative/consciousness-based engagement in education at large. In both instances, what was at one point a core epistemological modality in the respective traditions is marginalized, and often fiercely resisted. To encapsulate prior commentary: While it is common knowledge the improvisation was once central in the European classical tradition to which music studies ostensibly claims homage, far less recognized is that systems of logic, rational analysis and intellectual prowess that originate (at least in the West) in ancient Greek and Roman philosophical schools were rooted in contemplative practices that took awareness to realms of experience transcendent of the conventional cognitive activity that is prized (349). As noted, in both musical and educational instances, the epistemological underpinnings are lopped off, discarded (and kept suppressed), leaving only epistemic surfaces solidly intact. Just as unsustainable agricultural practices deplete the soil of essential nutrients, unsustainable musical and educational practice depletes surface engagement of essential foundations. Among the most severe casualties is the decimation of capacities for participants in the respective models to step outside and sustain robust self-critique.

I thus delineate a three-tiered framework for critical thinking (46-49, 349-55) in hopes of, at the very least, elevating critical inquiry around the nature of criticality itself. A core precept is that epistemologically expansive systems, especially when grounded in post-materialist consciousness foundations, are more conducive to both self-critique and external critique; epistemically limited systems tend to be paradigm-oblivious. The model I advance, coherent with integral principles and in sharp contrast with academic, materialist systems is three tiered, thus spanning 1st-2nd-3rd person dimensions. The conventional academy is confined to 3rd-person, object-mediated critical exchange, with modest, at best, 2nd-person, inter-objective reflection that takes into consideration socio-cultural parameters but stops notably short of actual process-based criteria. Most notable, moreover, is academic absence of 1st-person mechanisms and perspectives, where critical inquiry penetrates to levels of awareness transcendent of the very cognitive functioning that dominates.

The extent to which one is able to critically engage with both one's own ideas/assumptions and those of others is directly predicated on the extent to which one takes recourse to strata of consciousness beneath those in which ideas/assumptions are formulated.

In no way is this to suggest that the epistemologically diverse 1st-2nd-3rd person integral model (as opposed to the largely 3rd person academic model) is therefore immune to bias, but simply that it offers tools for those who are committed to using them. Teams with the best hitting, pitching and defense don't always win, let alone reach, the World Series; it is up to the players to make optimal use of the assets at their disposal. The same holds for critical vigilance. And when compared to the integral model, the academy—despite claims to critical authority—is particularly bereft of such tools. Thus, when it comes to the requisites for paradigmatic change, as opposed to the ornamental change to which higher education typically confines itself, how—by any reasonable account—can the academy be considered anything but a critical integrity catastrophe?

Borgo, who appears to have bought the mainstream illusion of criticality lock stock and barrel, thus outdoes himself when he makes the following statement:

“Sarath offers no critical lens through which to view the jazz tradition.”²⁸

Not only does he overlook ICC's examination of the jazz tradition from monocultural, multicultural and transcultural perspectives, correlating them with modernist and postmodernist principles, he takes the further step of issuing his assessment oblivious to the book's delineation of principles that underlie the critical inquiry process itself.²⁹

While Borgo seems sincere in his appeals for more convincing rationale about the nature of consciousness, he exhibits, in my view, very little awareness of the extent to which his materialist blinders may constrain his encounter with integral (or presumably other) postmaterialist principles and models. The inertia of the materialist academy only adds to the layers of critical integrity obstacles that need to be overcome. Here I might also argue that any such lapse carries with it not only philosophical ramifications, but real-world ramifications for how humanity navigates the growing challenges to its future survival. For which species *homo sapiens sapiens* will need to dig deeper than ever into its creative and spiritual well springs; inasmuch as solutions are sought according to seekers' worldview horizons, models of mind that deny deep consciousness, soul, and cosmic interconnectedness short circuit the kind of imaging necessary before it even begins.

In no way, to reiterate an earlier point, is this to suggest that *Improvisation, Creativity and Consciousness* is devoid of shortcomings. But if a conversation about this topic is to transpire where participants share with, and learn from each other, a fundamentally new culture of exchange must be established. Perhaps most perplexing about Borgo's review is his comment, early on, that “there is much to like” in ICC—a statement that is rendered all the more baffling given how little he provides in the way of example.³⁰

At its best, the peer-review process—both pre-publication and post-publication—can be invaluable to the development of individual scholar's ideas and thus their contributions to the

field at large. At its worst, the same process can provide a smokescreen for whatever kind of ideological agenda/s to which reviewers may be beholden. It is thus essential for the critical gaze to be directed as much back on the critic as that which is being critiqued.

While Borgo and I likely share different perspectives on how this applies to his review, let alone the innumerable points I make above, I nonetheless thank him for the attention he has devoted to *Improvisation, Creativity and Consciousness*.³¹ His review has prompted me to revisit the book and rekindled my excitement about its potential contributions to not only new frontiers in musicology but education and society at large—for all of which I am grateful.

¹ David Borgo, 2017, Review of Edward W. Sarath, *Improvisation, Creativity, and Consciousness: Jazz as Integral Template for Music, Education, and Society*, in *Jazz Research Journal*. In my response, I reference Borgo's words via inset passages or direct quotations, both of which are accompanied by footnotes. I reference my words or ideas in ICC either via quotations or narrative implication, in both cases providing page number (rather than footnote).

² Question for DB: What might materialism-based future music studies and overall educational paradigms look like? How might they differ from prevailing models, as well as the respective models that I outline in ICC's *Music School of the Future* and *Paradigmatic Change in the 21st Century Academy*? To be sure, these are far-reaching exercises that require enormous chunks of time to fulfill. My motivation for posing the question/s is my sense they would, at the very least, elevate materialist/post-materialist debates, if not prompt materialists to examine their assumptions in ways that are not common. With all due respect, and I am not alone in this viewpoint, many materialists have not come to terms with the ramifications of their view of the human being and reality for the future of education and our world.

³ In contrast to Borgo's assessment, I cite numerous materialist and post-materialist/integral sources to support these distinctions (see Part 3 in my essay).

⁴ Integral spirituality/art/science synthesis brings into focus parallel patterns among scientific materialists and musical materialists. Materialist scientists view science and scientific materialism as synonymous; post-materialism and science are incompatible, one cannot be a scientist and harbor spiritual views on consciousness. Integral science, on the other hand, asserts that one cannot be a true scientist and deny physically transcendent nonlocal dimensions of consciousness. Therefore, one can—and must indeed-be an integralist and a scientist.

Similarly, musical materialists commonly view the conventional Eurocanonic paradigm as synonymous with the European classical music *per se*. Critique of the interpretive specialization paradigm thus constitutes critique of the European canon; Borgo appears to succumb to this misperception, which as I point out then excludes evolutionary analysis. An integral reading of the European tradition distinguishes between the dominant academic paradigm and the creativity-based European tradition itself.

I do not suggest, however, that Borgo views the integral view of consciousness as anti-scientific, or devoid of supporting empirical research—including neuro-biological correlates to transcendent experience and even, as ICC celebrates, higher stage consciousness development.

⁵ The idea of nonduality, or subject-object unification, provides an interesting lens through which to view distinctions between materialist and post-materialist perspectives. The integral view of the primacy of consciousness is the basis for its nonduality premise, the age-old proposition, particularly vivid and well-articulated

in *Advaita Vedanta*, that boundaries between subjective and objective realities are illusory (*advaita* translates as “not two”). The fact that materialists of very contrasting persuasions also lay claim to some form of nonduality, and thus resolution of the mind-body problem, illuminates distinctions between the viewpoints. Reductionists, for example, claim mind-body integration by simply explaining away consciousness. Emergentists claim mind-body integration, and thus further illusions of nonduality, in their recognition that consciousness, once emerged, interacts and even shapes body. However, because consciousness is still considered a byproduct of a material substrate, such nondual claims fall dramatically short of integral conceptions. Here the entire spectrum of material (electrons, atoms, geological structures, galaxies) and nonmaterial (biological, psychological) structures emerge from universal, eternal stratum of consciousness.

⁶ Consciousness-based modalities such as meditation expand the post-materialist epistemic scope. The point is not that one cannot simultaneously be a meditator and harbor materialist inclinations. However, when it comes to close link in most meditation traditions between practice and theory, combined with advanced experiences invoked, incoherence with materialist premises becomes increasingly challenging.

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 90.

⁸ From Steve Lacy, *Findings: My Experience with the Soprano Saxophone*, p.9.

⁹ I find it curious that Borgo mentions in his review the 2104 CMS Manifesto, of which I am the primary author, and central to which is the Contemporary Improviser Composer Performer concept. Yet he fails to address the CICIP idea in his review, which—published not long before the Manifesto—significantly influenced that document. Were Borgo to situate his critique of my analysis of the improvisation-composition relationship within the CICIP context, I doubt he would infer polarization as opposed to co-evolutionary relationship between the processes, nor between interpretive (Eurocanonic) and contemporary creative musicianship.

¹⁰ ICC quotes Hadot from his book, *What is Ancient Philosophy?*

¹¹ This is not to suggest that Interpretive Performance Specialists do not invoke transcendent/spiritual experience; such experience is possible in all realms of human activity. However, ICC provides extensive analysis on distinctions between epistemically diverse and epistemically narrow transcendent pathways that I believe are essential to a broader and more inclusive music studies paradigm. Situating IP within CICIP artistry makes available the best of all worlds.

¹² I give numerous examples through a wide spectrum of possibilities: The boundary crossing explorations of the AACM since the 1960s and Creative Music Studios not long after that represent one end of the continuum. John Coltrane was legendary in ushering in several new major transformations in the jazz tradition with impact that extended far beyond; I analyze this as individuation taking the next step of innovation. Coltrane’s contemporary, Stan Getz, individuated largely within mainstream jazz horizons, toward the opposite end of the continuum. Even farther in that direction is when interpretive musicians individuate through performance of repertory, although here I emphasize that the prospects of this are optimal when that destination is arrived at through CICIP foundations.

¹³ Questions for DB: Might you elaborate on why you think Meyer’s notions of syntax are ‘outmoded’ Might it be that harmony, is central among his syntactic criteria, thus ruling out much modal music around the world be central? Might my modification (when appropriate), due to similar concerns, of the syntactic realm to “pitch-rhythmic languages,” which of course does not apply to all music but a significant range, alleviate your concern?

¹⁴ *Ibid*, Borgo p93.

¹⁵ Note to DB: My transcultural framework, which I believe differs from others’ use of the term, only began to take hold in ICC; I would encourage you to check out my more developed versions in *Black Music Matters* and *Music Studies and Its Moment of Truth*—I think you might resonate with the basic thrust.

¹⁶ Note to DB: I would be eager to hear your thoughts on my parallels between the place of tradition in contemporary musical and spiritual navigation. I not only believe you might find this a topic of interest, at least some resonance, and also another instance where you might rethink your ascribing an *atraditional* orientation to my vision.

¹⁷ Borgo, *Ibid*, 94.

¹⁸ Further examples of critical lapse are evident when Borgo construes exclusivity amid my arguments for expansiveness and inclusivity. When I predict that, among the many future developments in an integral paradigm of music studies and practice, that the large, stylistically open improvising ensemble—which has been among the many areas in which I have worked—will assume prominence (34), Borgo’s reaction is particularly puzzling. “So much for humility,” Borgo retorts. “It seems we have gone from an aura of elevated consciousness and inclusivity to a rather normative conclusion that what interests Sarath should interest us all.” (Borgo, p.92)

Given the case I make for the transidiomatic improvising experience to inform, and be informed by, a breadth of further engagement that exceeds what is typically found, I am not sure if Borgo’s concern is of a scope too broad and inclusive to bear fruit of any substance (certainly a valid concern), or the bizarre assumption that I advocate the replacement of trios, quartets and an infinitude of conventional areas with 35-member improvisatory contingents—a prospect that I know from firsthand experience with this kind of improvising may well shorten anyone’s life.

When he further ascribes to my thinking the inherent “superiority of Integral Theory . . . and jazz and improvised music,” (Borgo, 94) I will let readers decide for themselves if a case for jazz as self-transcending musical and extramusical gateway, rich in global and transdisciplinary connections, constitutes philosophical and/or idiomatic supremacy.

¹⁹ I further emphasize caution in case one might be inclined to conflate, as two examples, Antonio Damasio’s notion of “core consciousness” and/or David Chalmers’ of “phenomenal consciousness” (130) with the pure consciousness event.

²⁰ While, technically, *turiyatita cetena*/subtle consciousness and *bhagavad*/causal consciousness are still constrained by dualism, it would be grossly misguided to equate them with conventional notions of duality—as, for example, in Stephan J. Gould’s oft-cited relegation of science and religion to separate, “nonoverlapping magisteria,” or David Chalmers’ (earlier, he has since moved on) confession that dualism, despite its taboos in materialist circles, is philosophically “satisfying.” Higher stage parameters, even short of culminating unity/nonduality, also further underscore the folly of materialist nondual claims (see above fn).

²¹ An aspect of the integral understanding of intersubjectivity that entirely flips the narrative from this phenomenon as (at best, and few materialists would likely go this far) as an emergent property of individual consciousnesses to a foundational stratum in the cosmic unfolding. Meaning that, as Christian de Quincey convincingly argues, individual consciousness is a differentiated form of intersubjectivity rather than the other way round (405). I actually posit a two-way account of collective consciousness, that—perhaps paralleling the two-way concept of integral ‘holons’—is both primary to, yet also informed by individual consciousness.

²² *Ibid*, Borgo, 92.

²³ Interesting parallels are evident here between Borgo’s denial of my postmodern commentary, particularly its place within a modernist/postmodernist/integral cultural context. and his misreading of my evolutionary account of interpretive performance within the CICP framework in music Again, in both instances, inclusive analysis is either completely ignored, or worse, misread as exclusionary.

²⁴ Related is Borgo’s claim that an important reason Integral Theory has not gained a foothold in the academy is “Wilber’s aversion to critique,” which—while nothing new—reflects yet another example of unexamined critical hubris. Might it be that the academy is abjectly devoid of the tools to adequately engage Integral Theory, beyond the most superficial kinds of analysis?

²⁵ Ibid, Borgo 92

²⁶ Ibid

²⁷ Here an interesting question comes to the fore. To what extent is a book titled *Improvisation, Creativity and Consciousness: Jazz as Integral Template* obligated to argue for an integral view of consciousness as compared to alternatives, as opposed to a focus on illuminating how jazz embodies integral principles. In other words, there is a thing called 'jazz,' another thing called 'Integral Theory;' the title primarily obligates the book to delineate an integral understanding of jazz in relationship to an integral theory of consciousness. Might, then, a case for integralism over materialist or other alternatives be secondary? In any case, I believe ICC accomplishes both to a reasonable degree.

²⁸ Borgo, p. 93.

²⁹ For me, a curious pattern became increasingly evident through multiple readings of Borgo's review: While I had, even by the time ICC had gone to press, begun to compile a fairly extensive inventory of revisions to the book I would make when that time came, and looked forward to adding to this list upon post-publication feedback, there was notably little intersection between the items on my personal list and those of Borgo's critique. If anything, Borgo's concerns largely reinforced what I viewed as ICC's strengths, with the exception of occasional instances where I might make minor modifications (mainly through insertion of a sentence or two to reinforce or clarify prior points I had made). But talk about two contrasting perspectives on not only consciousness (which I knew going in having encountered and respected David's work) but—surprisingly—music, creativity, education and arts-driven change, if not even what constitutes productive scholarly exchange; his review and my response could not represent more opposite poles on that account. It happens.

³⁰ Although in some ways, Borgo's almost complete focus on negative critique has made my response, particularly given its emphasis on furthering dialogue, even easier. Would not even a few examples of what constitutes 'much to like' contribute to further dialogue?

³¹ I sincerely appreciate Borgo's statement that ICC's "proselytizing tone wears thin," its initial jolt notwithstanding. I will work on addressing that. I also wonder whether or not whatever irritation the book has caused might have influenced the tone, and possibly what I view as the considerable shortsightedness, of his review.